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THE NATURE OF THE DOCTRINAL
FUNCTION AND ITS ROLE IN
RATIONTAL THOUGHT
CASSIUS J. KEYSER *
IT is the aim of this paper to answer the following two questions:
What is a Doctrinal Function?
What is the essential r6le of doctrinal functions in logical
discourse?
It is assumed that for the most part the bearings of the dis-
cussion upon the study of legal science will be sufficiently ob-
vious without special or explicit indication.
In order that the answers may be made sufficiently definite
and clear it seems desirable or even necessary to begin by indi-
cating the senses in which certain cardinal terms, some of them
familiar and some of them unfpmiliar, are to be uniformly em-
ployed throughout. Among such terms are variable, function,
value of a variable or of a function, proposition, propositional
function, propositional content or subject-matter, propositional
form, postulate, postulate system or set, implication, implier,
implicate, hypothetical proposition or propositional form, cate-
gorical proposition or propositional form, and a variety of sub-
sidiary terms closely connected with the foregoing ones.
The Idea of a Variable
In human discourse, whatever be the subject or the field, hardly
any notion occurs more frequently than that of variable and
hardly any term is more familiar. The fact is not at all aston-
ishing, for discourse is necessarily a more or less faithful mirror
of the world, and the world, as every one knows, is a locus of
ubiquitous and ceaseless change or variation. But it is some-
what astonishing that in discourse it is almost always tacitly
assumed, both by the speaker or the writer and by the hearers
or the readers, that the meaning of the term variable is so ob-
vious as to require no explanation whatever. It has very seldom
occurred to anyone to question seriously the validity of that
almost universal assumption, and so the literature aiming to
tell precisely what it is that the term variable signifies, or ought
to be understood as signifying, is exceedingly meager. Yet no
one can reflect, even a little, upon the question of the term's
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meaning without discovering two facts: that the question is
fundamentally important and that it is very difficult. Though I
cannot undertake to deal with it quite adequately here, I venture
to hope that the following brief discussion of it may not be
entirely unprofitable.
Concerning Symbols
It is necessary to begin by thinking a little about the nature of
symbols, for we are going to see that, whatever the essential
significance of the term variable may be, a variable is, in dis-
course, always a symbol. The symbol may be any familiar or
unfamiliar word or any combination of words, as a phrase or a
sentence, or it may be x or y or z or any other mark or combina-
tion of marks. The first thing to.get clear is that a symbol
symbolizes and that whatever symbolizes symbolizes something.
To speak as if there could be a non-symbolizing symbol or as if
there could be symbolizing without symbolizing anything is to
utter sheer nonsense-nonsense of the sort that implicitly
involves a contradiction in terms. One could as rationally speak
of the possibility of remembering without remembering anything
or of losing without losing anything or of eating without eating
anything or of supposing without making any hypothesis. In-
stead of uniformly saying that such-and-such is what a given
symbol symbolizes, it will often be convenient to follow usage
and say that such-and-such is what the symbol denotes or means
or stands for or represents.
Again, it is of the utmost critical importance to see clearly,
and to keep steadily in mind, the fact that the symbolic char-
acter of a symbol is never intrinsic or inherent in it. Although
it is true that anything whatever may be employed as a symbol,
yet no thing ever is or can be a symbol except when and so long
as it is employed as such. In other words, all the symbols that.
occur in human discourse are man-made-that is, man-chosen
or man-invented for the purpose-and the meaning of any sym-
bol is man-given, or man-assigned. If I be one of the legion who
either in their theory deny the fact stated or in their practice
ignore it and violate it, then I belong to the immense logolatrous
class of mankind, I belong to the superstitious multitude of
symbol-worshippers, I have not yet achieved emancipation from
the ages-old world-wide tyranny of verbal magic.
What a given symbol denotes or represents may be one and
but one object of thought or of sense or it may be 'any one' (but
not a specific or chosen one) of two or more such objects.' Let
As here used the familiar phrase 'any one' is absolutely indispensable but
its meaning is exceedingly subtle. For a discussion of it I may refer the
reader to my MATHEMATICAL PpiLosoPrIY (1922) 235-239.
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me exemplify these two types of symbols. Suppose the symbol
to be the figure 5, say, or the word five, or the numerical symbol
7, or the name Mahatma Gandhi or 'present king of England'
or 'Newtonian law of gravitation' or x in the expression, an
integer x greater than 10 and less than 12, or P in the expression,
let P be a point common to a given pair of intersecting lines. It
is evident that in all such examples what the symbols represent
is one and but one thing. On the other hand, suppose the symbol
to be such a word as law ofr land or love or God or god or Devil
or devil or mind or relation or joy or evil or poet or justice or
ethic or contract or religion or tort or circle or x in the expres-
sion, let x be a number greater than 10, or P in the expression,
let P be a point in the earth's orbit. It is obvious that in every
such case what the symbol stands for is 'any one' (but no specific
one) of two or more things.
We are now prepared to define the term variable, or at least
to describe the term's meaning with a good deal of precision:
A variable is a, symbol so employed, as to rcpresczt any onze of
two or more objects. It is evident that any mark or any term in
speech may be made to play the part of a variable. What is
more important to observe is the fact, which no competent critic
can fail to discover, that in human discourse, even the most exact,
the occurrence of variables is vastly more frequent than speakers
or writers or hearers or readers commonly suppose. It need
hardly be said that a symbol occurring in two discourses may
be a variable in one of them without being such in the other.
To any given variable there corresponds a class of objects
such that the variable represents 'any one' of them. That class
of objects is called the variable's range. The objects composing
the range are the variable's values or, as one might say, its mean-
ings. A few simple examples will help to clarify. The range of
the variable x in the expression 3x is the class of things such
that each of them admits of being multiplied by three; that is,
the range of the variable's values is the class of all numbers.
Even if we suppose the terms point and line to have been com-
pletely defined, the statement, two points determine a line, con-
tains two variables, point and line; the range of the former is
the class of all the points of space and that of the latter is the
totality of the lines of space. Again, consider such statements
as these: God is love; knowledge is good; the aim of education is
preparation for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The
first has two variables, God and love; also the second, knlowledge
and good; the third has at least four, education, life, liberty
and happiness. The range of values of any given one of them
comprises all and only such diverse meanings as men have at-
tached or may attach to the corresponding term. Like examples




The name Function, it is said, was first pronounced by Leibnitz.
The idea denoted by it is, at least in rudimentary form, far older
than the name-as old no doubt as human reflection upon human
experience. Since the time of Leibnitz the idea has so grown and
developed in importance and power that the function concept
may now be said, without exaggeration, to have attained
supremacy alike in the enterprise of mathematics and in that of
science. In that fact there is nothing to astonish. For regarding
mathematics and science one can say, with a very fair approxi-
mation to truth, that these two great knowledge-seeking enter-
prises are both of them sustained by a common hope-the hope
of discovering uniformities in the processes by which, in our
world, change begets change. And it is doubtless from the uni-
versally observed fact, or seeming fact, of such begetting that
the notion of function has sprung.
What is the meaning of the term function as employed in
mathematics and in the physical sciences and, I may add, as it is
or may be employed in the social sciences including the science
of law? The answer must be given in terms of variables and of
relations among them. Perhaps nothing is more familiar than
the fact that two or more variables may be so related or con-
nected that each of them depends, as we say, upon the others, as
the circumference of a circle depends upon the length of the
radius, as the enforceability of a municipal law depends upon
the law's relation to the people's will, as the volume of a gas de-
pends upon temperature and pressure, and so on endlessly. All
such examples illustrate functionality or functional relationship.
But to define the term function it is necessary to be more precise.
In the interests of clarity it seems best to define it first in terms
of two variables and subsequently in terms of two or more.
The first definition is: If two variables are so related that to
each value of either there corresponds, in a definite way, at least
one value of the other, each of the variables is called a function
of the other. Consider, for example, 3x; here x is a variable and
so is 3x; for conv enience denote 3x by y and set y=3x; plainly
to each value of x or y there corresponds a value of y or x; hence
x and y are each a function of the other. So are r and s if r be
the radius and s be the surface of a sphere. So, too, are x and y
in y 2 = 4x, 2 for to each value of either correspond two values of
the other.
A more general definition of function is: If two or more vari.
ables are so related that to any given set of values comprising
one and but one value for each of the variables except one of
them there corresponds at least one value of the latter variable,
each of the variables is said to be a function of all the others.
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Thus, if v be the volume of a parallelepiped, say a slab, and if
1, b and t be respectively its length, breadth, and thickness, each
of the four variables is a function of the remaining three. In
x+2y-3z+8y -- 10z 3+w +12=0 each of the variables is
clearly a function of the rest. Obviously there are countless
cases in which one may know that a functional relationship exists
though no one has yet been able to formulate it with precision.
For example, as every one knows, the prosperity of a given agri-
cultural community is a function of such variables as climate,
soil fertility, market availability, implemental equipment, the
experience of the people, their diligence, their intelligence, their
energy, and other variables. For another example, consider
medicine. It is a mattei of common knowledge that medical
theory or medical practice is a function of numerous variables
including such as chemical knowledge, the science of physics,
biological science, psychological discovery, and so on. Doubtless
the veracity of many a one is a function of such variables as the
veracity of his friends and neighbors, his sense of honor, his
courage, his fear, his vanity, his cupidity, and the like. Again,
it requires no very extraordinary degree of intelligence but only
a little attention to see that the municipal law of a community,
a state or a nation, is not only a variable but is a function of
many other variables, as modes and forms of business, for ex-
ample, manners, customs, mores, religious opinion and feeling,
scientific discovery, invention, applications of science, industrial
development, ethical sentiment, political theory, and others.
Wherever we look we discover functional relationships. They are
literally ubiquitous. Under scrutiny the universe appears as an
immense locus or embodiment of functions. To discover and to
formulate them with-a view to understanding and controlling
the world is the supreme aim of science if not the dominant
concern of man.
Propositional Functozs
Consider the statement S:
x is a commandment of the Decalogue.
Regarding S it is important to note carefully the following
facts:
(1) S contains a variable x;
(2) S, though it has the form of a proposition, is not a prop-
osition, for a proposition is a statement that is true or else false,
but, as no definite value or signification has been assigned to ".,
S is not such a statement; it is, properly speaking, neither true
nor false;
(3) Though S is not itself a proposition, it is a matrix or a
source whence many propositions, some true, some false, may be
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derived by assigning to x or substituting for it now one and now
another of its possible values. Thus on replacing x by Thou
shalt not kill or by Thou shalt not bear false witness, or by Thou
shalt not drink wine or by Thou shalt not take a bath, we obtain
one or another of four definite propositions, two of them true,
two of them false.
(4) Among definite terms-terms each denoting one and but
one thing-there are many which, if substituted for x, yield,
not propositions, but sheer non-sense. Such a term is the term,
The Decalogue. Substituting it for x, we get the statement, The
Decalogue is a commandment of the Decalogue, which is not a
proposition but is a species of non-sense-the kind of non-sense
that consists in speaking as if a class of things could be a mem-
ber of itself, as if, for example, the class of locomotives were
itself a locomotive, or as if the class of apples or of asses were
itself an apple or an ass. To speak thus is merely to jabber. So
it is seen that the range of the values of x is limited-many
things are excluded as yielding, not propositions, but non-sense.
(5) The range of the values of x comprises all and only such
definite somewhats that replacing x by any one of them yields a
proposition (true or else false).
The foregoing statement S is a simple example of what is
known as a Propositional Function, a weighty term invented and
introduced into the vocabularies of science and mathematics by
Mr. Bertrand Russell. The given specimen contains but one
variable of the type above characterized. But a propositional
function may involve any given number of such variables. A
simple specimen involving five of them is the statement, x
reported that y discovered that z bore the relation R to iv. I-low
may the general concept, above exemplified, be defined? I believe
the following definition to be fairly precise and clear:
A statement is a propositional function if and only if it satisfics
the following two conditions:
(a) The statement has the. form of a proposition but is not a
proposition;
(b) The statement involves one or more variables each of
which has a range of values comprising all and only such definite
somewhats that if any one of them be substituted for the
corresponding variable and if the like be done for each of the
other variables, the result is a proposition.
. It is necessary to guard against being deceived by superficial
semblance. A statement may have the outward appearance of a




(1) John Doe murdered Richard Roe;
(2) Richard Roe is not dead and never has been;
(3) John Doe murdered some one who is not dead and never
has been;
(4) Everyx is a y;
(5) Every y is a z;
(6) Every x is a z;
(7) If John Doe murdered Richard Roe and Richard Roe is
not dead and never has been, then John Doe murdered some one
who is not dead and never has been;
(8) If every x is a y and every y a z, then every -,, is a z.
The first six of the statements obviously satisfy both of the
conditions (a) and (b) and so are propositional functions. But
neither (7) nor (8), despite the presence in them of the vari-
ables John Doe, Richard Roe, x, y, and z, is such a function, for
neither of them satisfies condition (a). They fail to satisfy it for
the reason that, as a keen glance suffices to show, each of them is,
just as it stands and -without regard to any particular values of
the variables, a genuine proposition. It happens, moreover,
though this is not essential, that the two propositions are true.
The fact that such statements as (7) and (8) are not proposi-
tional functions but are definite propositions merits the closest
attention. It is evident that (7) is intended to be equivalent to
(9) 'John Doe murdered Richard Roe' and 'Richard Roe is
not dead and never has been' imply 'John Doe murdered one who
is not dead and never has been',
and that (8) is equivalent to
(10) 'Every . is a y' and 'every y is a z' imply 'everyx is a z'.
So it is seen that what (7) or (8) or (9) or (10) asserts is an
implication. That the assertions, notwithstanding the presence
of variables in them, are not propositional functions but are
propositions is due to a fact than which nothing in the theory of
rational discourse is more fundamentally important: I mean the
fact that logical implication, whenever it holds, holds between
the forms of statements quite independently of their contfnts if
they happen to have content. Any reader who grasps that fact
will instantly see that (7), (8), (9), and (10) are, as asscrtions,
absolutely unaltered by replacing their variables by any definite
particular values.
The Values of Propositio wl Fumctions
From that cautionary digression, I now return to the considera-
tion of propositional functions. The values of the variables of
a given propositional function fall into two mutually exclusive
classes, those which, on being substituted for the variables, yield
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true propositions, and those which yield false ones. The vari-
ables of the former class may be conveniently called verifiers of
the function, and those of the other class falsifiers of the func-
tion. The verifiers of a propositional function will be called the
proper values of its variables, and the falsifiers of it the improper
values of its variables. Any proposition derivable from a given
propositional function by replacing its variables by values of
them may be called a value of the function. The values of a
given propositional function constitute two mutually exclusive
classes, the class of those that are true propositions and the class
of those that are false ones. The true ones will be called the
proper values of the function and the false ones improper values
of it.
It is perhaps worth while to point out a distinction which,
though it is pretty obvious, might nevertheless be harmfully
overlooked. The distinction is this: the general term, a prop-
ositional function, is a variable whose range of values is the
class of specific propositional functions, while any given one of
the specific propositional functions is a variable whose range of
values is the class of propositions derivable from it in the way
already explained and exemplified. The propriety of calling a
propositional function by that name obviously rests upon two
considerations: one of them is that each of the things so named
is a variable depending upon one or more other variables; and
the other one is that the values of that variable are propositions.
Frequency of Propositional Functions
There is no limit to the number or to the variety of propositional
functions that either exist or can be invented. Their occurrence
is by no means confined to the literature of what is commonly
called mathematics and the literature of what is commonly
called science. On the contrary, they are to be found in all osten-
sibly rational discourse no matter what its subject or field. For
it must not be supposed that the variables of a propositional
function are always such marks as x, y, z, etc. Indeed they are,
more frequently, ordinary words of familiar speech. Consider,
for example, the statement, God is love.
If, as frequently happens, that statement occurs in a discourse
in which there is no indication of the senses in which the terms
God and love are to be understood, then, in and for that dis-
course, the statement is exactly equivalent to the statement x is
y, and, in the interest of clarity, might as well or better be re-
placed by it. If, as also frequently happens, the discourse affords
some indication of the senses in question but not sufficient indi-
cation to identify them, then the terms are still variables, not
quite so obviously but just as genuinely variables as under the
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former supposition. It is clear that in the one case as in the
other, the statement in question is, in and for the discourse in
which it occurs, not a proposition but is a propositional function,
and, being such, is neither true nor false but has numerous
values, some of them proper, some of them improper, according
as they are true propositions or false ones.
What has just been said of the assertion, God is love, evidently
is, mutatis 'mutandis, no less valid for such a statement as Knowl-
edge is a good, or Communism is a magnificent experiment, or
Universal education is essential to the prosperity of genuine
democracy, or Science and religion are compatible, or "A law is
a rule of action prescribed by the supreme power of a state
commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong," or
"Equity is the correction of that wherein the law by reason of
its universality is defective," and so on and on. Any student
who has grasped the concept, propositional function, and who,
if he have not done so before, proceeds to examine some treatise,
almost any treatise, in his field, whether it be law or economics
or medicine or theology or ethics or art or philosophy or physical
science or any other, with a view to noting the occurrence or
non-occurrence of propositional functions in the work will be
astounded to find that a great majority of the author's state-
ments, though regarded by him as propositions and intended to
be so regarded by his readers, are in fact not propositions at all
but are genuine propositional functions. Indeed it is not ex-
travagant to say that what mainly fills the books of the world's
libraries is not propositions, whether true or false, not proper
or improper values of propositional functions, but propositional
functions themselves. That fact, almost universally unrecog-
nized or ignored, probably goes further than any other single
fact to account for the endless disputations of men, for it is
probably true that nothing else is so prolific a source of disputa-
tion as propositional functions regarded by mankind as proposi-
tions and so as true or else false while in fact they are neither.
So it is seen that propositional functions may be employed
either unconsciously or consciously. When employed uncon-
sciously, as for the most part they have been and are, when em-
ployed, I mean, in the belief that they are propositions and so
have the quality of being true or else false, they produce all
manner of misunderstanding, lead to unending disputation, and
thus work immeasurable harm. On the other hand, the conscious
use of propositional functions as such is not only highly advan-
tageous but often absolutely indispensable in research, in the
formulation of its results, and in criticism of all such literature
as either is, or aims at being, discourse of reason. Both of the
facts just stated, and especially the latter one, will become in-




In the course of the centuries the term postulate has been em-
ployed in a variety of closely related but differing senses.2 In
the present article I will employ it uniformly in accord with
what I deem the best usage of modern mathematicians and men
of science. What, then, are we to understand by the term postu-
late?
The reader knows that many a discourse contains no logical
proof of any of its statements; he knows that no discourse can
prove all of its statements; and he knows that, if a discourse
proves some of its statements, it contains also some unproved
statements that imply the proved ones and from which these
have been logically deduced. In such a discourse the impliers are
postulates.
The matter may be stated more precisely as follows. Given
a discourse that proves some of its statements; denote by C the
class of all the proved statements; among the unproved state-
ments there are some statements-call the class of them C'-
that together imply the statements of C and from which these
have been derived by logical deduction. In and for the given
discourse, the statements composing the class C' are postulates.
Finally, the term postulate may be yet more precisely, even
if not more clearly, defined in the following form.
In and for a given discourse a statement S occurring in it is a
postulate if and only if S satisfies the following three conditions:
(a) S occurs without proof or attempted proof;
(b) S is a member of a class of statements of the discourse
that imply other statements of it;
(c) S is actually used as an implier in the discourse-that is,
from S (taken alone or in conjunction with other impliers) the
discourse deduces, or endeavors to deduce, one or more of its
statements.
Sacrificing some precision for the sake of brevity we may say
that for a statement to be a postulate it is necessary and suffi-
cient that it be unproved, that it be an implier, and that it be
employed as such.
It should be added that in our time the terms postulate, axiom,
assumption, and primitive proposition are uniformly employed,
at least by critical mathematicians, quite interchangeably as
exact synonyms. It has not always been so. The reader is
doubtles's aware of the fact that in former times the term axiom
2 If any readers of this article chance to be interested in the history of the
term postulate and its kind they may be referred to the Introduction to Dr.
T. L. Heath's edition of EucLm's ELEMENTS, where, as I have elsewhoro
said, "terms and kindred matters are set in the bright light of critical com-
mentary from the days of Plato down to the present time."
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was employed to signify a "self-evident or necessary truth," it
being then generally believed that there are such truths in con-
tradistinction from such as are not "self-evident" or "neces-
sary" but require proof.3
Postulate Systems or Sets
A postulate is one thing; a system of postulates is another. What
are we to understand by a postulate system? It is necessary to
consider this question very carefully, for a thorough understand-
ing of the term postulate system is indispensable if one is to
grasp firmly the significance of the term Doctrinal Function
when, at a later stage of this preparatory discussion, the mean-
ing of that term shall have been defined.
Suppose given a collection of postulates. These may be com-
patible (consistent) or incompatible (inconsistent); they may
be compendent (connected) or incompendent (unconnected);
they may be dependent or independent. What do the adjectives
signify? The postulates of a collection are said to be compatible
if and only if none of them contradicts another one; they are
said to be compendent if and only if they are concerned with a
set of mutually related, or interrelated, variables; and they are
said to be independent if and only if none of them is logically
implied by one or more of the others.
We are now prepared to define the term postulate system or
set. The definition is this: A postulate systcm or set is a collec-
tion of postulates that are both compatible. and compcndcnt. In-
dependence, though desirable, is not essential.
The concept just now defined is by no means quite so easy to
appropriate as it may seem to be. We can greatly improve our
understanding of it by taking the pains to examine attentively
some of the typical features of a concrete example or specimen.
Postulate systems abound, some of them very carefully devised
by mathematicians and employed by them with much formality
and much regard for rigor, and some of them less carefully de-
vised, and employed with less formality and less regard for rigor,
by non-mathematicians. For our present purpose it will be best
to select a specimen of the foriner kind, with the understanding
that, though the specimen is taken from elementary mathe-
matics, what will be said of it as a system will be valid for all
postulate systems whatever. The specimen I have selected has
world-wide fame. It is the system devised by Professor David
Hilbert to serve as a basis for Euclidean geometry and is found
3 1n view of the above stated critical usage, I have not been a little
astonished to find that in so generally excellent a work as the PnEACTiCAL
STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE the term axiom is defined
exclusively in the old and now definitely obsolete sense.
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in his Foundations of Geometry. Hilbert's postulates-called
axioms by him-are 21 in number. It will be sufficient to state
the following five of them.
(1) Two distinct points determine a line.
(3) Three non-collinear points determine a plane.
(7) Every straight line contains at least two points; every
plane at least three points; and space at least four points not in
one plane.
(10) Of any three collinear points, one and but one is between
the other two.
(15) If a line-segment is congruent to each of two other seg-
ments, these are congruent to each other.
The Hilbert system is here adduced solely as a typical repre-
sentative of postulate systems in general. The following brief
study of it has for its aim to exhibit, somewhat concretely,
notable properties belonging to all postulate systems. For the
sake of emphasis and lucidity such common properties will be
stated in italics.
From the postulates of the Hilbert system it is possible, as the
author has shown, to deduce logically all of the theorems of
Euclidean geometry; in other words, the theorems are logically
implied by the postulates, the postulates being the impliers (or
hypotheses) and the theorems their implicates (or conclusions).
The corresponding general fact is this: The postulates of any
given system logically imply a body of other statements, which
may be rightly called theorems; the relation of the postulates to
the theorems being that of impliers to their implicates.
In the foregoing statement of Hilbert postulates I have itali-
cised six words: point, line, plane, space, between, and congruent,
of which the last two evidently denote relations. I have done so
for the reason that these terms are what the postulates are osten-
sibly assertions about. Professor Hilbert has deliberately re-
frained from explicitly telling the reader, or trying to tell him,
what any one of the terms in question is to represent. The six
words, thus deliberately left undefined, are variables. The proper
values of the variables are such and only such as verify, or
satisfy, the postulates-they are such, that is, that substitution
of a properly selected set of them for the variables yields prop-
ositions that are true. It is not very difficult to show, and in my
Mathematical Philosophy I have shown, that the proper values
are of different types, some of them geometric, some of them
arithmetical or numerical, and some of them neither the one nor
the other. So it is seen that the Hilbert postulates are not prop-
ositions, as they are often and quite misleadingly said to be,
but are propositional functions, whose variables have for proper
values any and all such as verify the functions. The general
fact, thus exemplified by a special case, may be briefly enunciated
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as follows: The postulates of any postulate system are proposi-
tianal functions, and the proper values of their variables are the
verifiers of the functions.
In the theorems deducible from the Hilbert postulates there
occur, in addition to the six undefined terms above noted, many
defined terms, such as angle, triangle, rectangle, circle, sphere,
and so on. But every defined term is defined, directly or in-
directly, by means of the six undefined terms. These, we have
seen, are variables. It follows that any defined term is also a
variable essentially dependent on the fundamental six. It is thus
evident that the theorems are, ultimately, assertions about the
variables found in the postulates and are, like the latter, not
propositions, but propositional functions. Inasmuch as the
postulates imply the theorems, it is obvious that verifiers of the
former are also verifiers of the latter. The corresponding
general fact is this: The statements, or theorems, implied by a
postulate system, are, like the latter, propositionzal functions
involving, ultimately, the same variables as the postulates and
owning the same verifiers.
Owing to the fact that in the Hilbert discourse the six postulate
symbols-point, line, plane, space, between, congruent-are, as
already indicated, employed throughout as variables, we may,
without the slightest gain or loss of generality, replace them
respectively by x, y, z, w, r and e, or by any other meaningless
marks. That what I have just said is literally and strictly true
may be at first a bit difficult to see, for the terms point, line, etc.,
are so very familiar that it requires some effort to avoid regard-
ing them as having some inherent or intrinsic meaning of their
own, which they have not. If we make the indicated substitu-
tions, the foregoing Hilbert postulates will then stand as follows:
(1) Two distinct x's determine a y.
(3) Three x's not belonging to a same y determine a z.
(7) Every y contains at least two -'s; every z at least three
x's not belonging to a same y; and w at least four x's not belong-
ing to a same z.
(10) Of any three xo's belonging to a y, one and but one has
the relation r to the other two.
(15) If a y-segment has the relation 21 to each of two other
y-segments, then these have the relation r' to each other. And
so on for the rest of the twenty-one postulates.
It is sufficiently obvious that such a substitution made in the
postulates gets itself thereby automatically extended throughout
the whole discourse growing out of them and resting upon them.
Thus all definitions get restated in terms of the variables ., y, z,
w, r and r'. Though not logically necessary, it would be desir-
able to replace the old names of defined terms by new names
or other symbols. And all theorems would get restated in terms
7251932]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the new names or new symbols and the variables x, y, z,
etc. But the relation of logical implication between the re-
stated postulates and the restated theorems would remain exactly
what it was before the substitution; in other words, the restated
theorems would be deducible from the restated postulates without
the slightest alteration of logical process. The importance of
that fact is supreme, resting, as it does, upon the sovereign
principle, which I have already signalized, that the relation of
logical implication, or deducibility, when it holds, holds between
the forms of propositional functions, quite independently of their
seeming content, or seeming subject-matter, quite independently,
that is, of their variables, it being these that give the pure forms
the semblance of having content. The foregoing considerations
have been adduced, not to prove, but to illustrate and render
intelligible, the following momentous fact: The postulates of any
given system, no matter how familiar the words employed in
them as undefined terms, or variables, can, without gain or loss
of "generality, be so restated that the undefined terms, or vari-
ables, shall be reprsented by such marks as x, y, z, ... ; and the
relation of implication between the postulates and thbir impli-
cates, or theorems, will hold exactly as before.
Again, we must not fail to note that the essential statements
in the Htilbert discourse fall into three classes: the postulates P;
the theorems T,, T2, . .. ; and the class of assertions, P implies
T,, P implies T, . . . . . The postulates and the theorems are, as
we have seen, propositional functions. But the assertions, P
implies T,, P implies T 2, . . . are not propositional functions but
are true propositions, for they assert implications, and these, as
we have before seen, depend exclusively upon the forms of P,
T, T 2,... and not at all upon their variables or upon what these
may denote. So is exemplified the general fact: Any postula-
tional discourse-discourse confined to the laying down of a sys-
tem of postulates and to the deduction and enunciation of their
implicates, or theorems-contains, in addition to the two classes
of propositional functions (the postulates and the theorems), a
body of propositions asserting the implications, one such asser-
tion for each implicate.
Finally, it is necessary to attend carefully to the distinctions
signified by the adjectives, Hypothetical and Categorical. A
proposition having the form, P implies T, or one admitting of
statement in that form, is hypothetical, the implier P being com-
monly called the hypothesis, and the implicate T the consequence
or conclusion. All other propositions are categorical; in other
words, a categorical proposition is one that does not assert an
implication. Such a proposition is always a value of a proposi-
tional function. For example, the categorical proposition, the
specific gravity of iron is greater than that of water, is a proper
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value of the propositional function, the specific gravity of x is
greater than that of y. The two forms are identical; and so we
will say that propositional functions are also categorical.
It is common, always possible, and often convenient to put a
hypothetical proposition, P implies T, in the form: if P, then T.
But here one must be cautious, for many a categorical proposi-
tion is stated in the if-then form. A simple example is: if it
lightens, then it will thunder. This is categorical, not hypo-
thetical, for in asserting it we do not mean to assert that 'it will
thunder' is deducible logically from 'it lightens'. It may be that
thunder does always follow lightning, but, if so, the fact can
become known only by observation, not by deduction. Another
example is the following if-then statement of Euclid: If the
square on one side of a triangle is equal to the sum of the squares
on the other sides, then the triangle is right-angled. This is
categorical, not hypothetical. For Euclid is not asserting, and
it is indeed not true, that the "then" clause is logically implied
by the "if" clause. What he is asserting, and what is true, is
that the whole if-then statement is a logical implicate of the
postulates of his geometry. So it is evident that the form, P
implies T, is the best form, and ought to be adopted as the stand-
ard form, for asserting hypothetical propositions.
It is essential to perceive that the truth or falsity of a hypo-
thetical proposition depends solely on its form, and that the
truth or falsity of a categorical proposition depends on its con-
tent. For example, the hypothetical proposition, 'x is greater
than y' implies 'x+z is greater than y+z', and the hypothetical
proposition, '5 is greater than 7' implies '6 is greater than 8', are
both of them true because of form, regardless of content; while
the hypotheticals, 'x is greater than y' implies "a+z is greater
than y+2z', '5 is greater than 4' implies '5+1 is greater than
4+2', are both false on account of form, regardless of content.
But the categoricals, 2±5=7, 2+5=9, are respectively true and
false in virtue of content only; while, ,-y=z, though categori-
cal, is neither true nor false, being a propositional function.
What Doctrbw Fuznctiozs Are
We are now at length prepared to define, and (I hope) to under-
stand, the meanings of the term Doctrinal Function. I have
used the plural and said "meanings" because, as we are soon to
see, doctrinal functions are of two types, which, though inti-
mately related, are yet radically distinct. It will presently be
seen, too, that doctrinal functions of the one type may, with nice
propriety, be described as hypothetical, and those of the other
type as categorical. It will be best, because clearer, to define
the two types separately, as follows:
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A doctrinal function of hypothetical type is the total body of
propositions, P implies T1 P implies T2, . . . where P represent&
the postulates of a system and where T1, T, . . denote their
logical implicates, or theorems.
A doctrinal function of categorical type is the total body of
propositional functions, P,, P, . . . , Pk, T1, T, . . . , where the P's
are the postulates of a system and the T's are their logical im-
plicates, or theorems.
A glance suffices to show three noteworthy facts: (1) A doc-
trinal function of hypothetical type is composed of hypothetical
propositions, while one of categorical type is composed of prop-
ositional functions, and these, we have seen, are categorical in
form; (2) In the former case the constituent propositions are
not a mere collection but are so tied together logically as to
constitute an indissoluble organic whole, and in the latter case
the component propositional functions, far from being a mere
ensemble, are doubly bound together by the fact that their vari-
ables are all of them interrelated and by the further fact that,
though there is present no assertion of implication, yet some of
the component functions do in fact imply all the rest; (3) The
two types of doctrinal functions are so related that it is impos-
sible to construct one of hypothetical, type without at the same
time constructing one of categorical type, but the converse is not
true, for it is conceivable that one might assemble a set of prop-
ositional functions such that a few of them imply all the rest
and nothing else without being aware of the fact of such impli-
cation, but the occurrence of such an event, though possible, is
extremely improbable.
In constructing a doctrinal function of hypothetical type, the
constituent propositions, P implies T,, P implies T,... are not
always, perhaps not usually, stated thus explicitly and formally.
More frequently than not the procedure is to state the postulates
P, then to deduce therefrom an implicate or theorem T, and
thereupon to enunciate T as 'proved', the assertion, P implies T,
being omitted as a thing understood without formal enunciation.
But, if the author of such a discourse be suitably interrogated,
he will say: "I have not asserted, nor have I proved or tried to
prove, P to be true; I have not asserted, nor have I proved or
tried to prove, T to be true; what I have proved, and what I have
asserted, if not formally and explicitly, then at least implicitly,
is the proposition, P implies T. The establishment of such prop-
ositions has been, properly speaking, my sole aim and achieve-




Doctrinal Functions as Matrices of Doctrines
Why the name 4 doctrinal function? Because what it represents
is a variable having, as we are about to see, doctrines for its
values.
Just as a propositional function has the form of a proposition
without being one, so a doctrinal function has the form of a
doctrine without being one. For the propositions constituting a
doctrine must have content, or subject-matter-a doctrine must
be about something-but the constituent propositions or proposi-
tional functions making up a doctrinal function evidently have
not. And just as putting definite values for the variables in a
propositional function yields propositions, so by putting definite
values for the variables in the postulates of a doctrinal function,
we get a doctrine. As before, let P stand for the system of
postulates, P',, P, .... , P,. Now suppose the variables in these
to be replaced by some definite set of their values. We thus get
from P a corresponding system P' of propositions, P',, P, .. • I
P', and at the same time from T., T, ... a corresponding system
of propositions, 7'1 T',T .... These propositions have content,
or subject-matter, namely, that of the values by which the vari-
ables were replaced. The categorical propositions, P P'*, I
P'k, T',, T' ... constitute a doctrine-we may call it categorical
-about that subject-matter. This doctrine is a value of the
categorical doctrinal function, 11 F, ... , P;, T1, T,..., and is
a proper value of it provided the substituted values are verifiers
of the postulates. The hypothetical propositions, P' implies T'1 ,
P' implies T%, . .. constitute a doctrine-we may call it hypo-
thetical-about the same subject-matter. This doctrine is a value
of the hypothetical doctrinal function, P implies T,, P implies
T_,...., and is a proper value of it provided the values substi-
tuted are verifiers" of the postulates. Substitution of another set
of values will yield two other doctrines-one of each type-
about a different subject-matter.
It is thus seen that a doctrinal function is a matrix or source
of doctrines having the same form as the function. It is con-
venient to say that a doctrine derived from a doctrinal function
in the way indicated is a result of applying the function to
some definite kind of subject-matter, or we may say that the
doctrine is an intenpretation of the function.
4 The first occurrence of the name, doctrinal function, which was invented
by myself, is found in my article Concerning Multiple In7terpretationw of
Postdate Systenzs (1913) JOURNAL OF PsYcHoLoGY AND SCEN;TIFic MrrTOD.




Doctrinal Functions Often Constructed and Applied
Simultaneously
It is highly important to signalize the fact that the foregoing
propositions, P' implies T', P' implies T'2, . . . , constituting a
doctrine, are, as assertions of implication, identical with the
propositions, P implies T1, P implies T2, . . ., constituting the
doctrinal function. "Identical" for the reason that implication,
as I must again repeat, depends solely on form, and that all
the forms involved in the former case are identical with those
of the latter. The fact signalized renders possible a certain
notable and fairly frequent practice among builders of doc-
trinal functions. I mean the often obfuscating and misleading
practice in which a doctrinal function is both constructed and
applied to some subject-matter at one and the same time, as if
the two deeds were one, and in such a way that a reader gets
the impression that he is witnessing the construction, not of
a doctrinal function, but of a doctrine, although he is in fact
witnessing both at once. An instance of that practice is the
work of Hilbert, which I have already cited so often. What
Hilbert has there set up is, primarily and fundamentally, a
doctrinal function, one of whose many values is the doctrine
familiarly called Euclidean geometry. But while building up
the function Hilbert at the same time applies it to geometric
subject-matter-a fact shown by his use of certain geometric
figures. Because the reader's attention is thus concentrated upon
the rising structure of the geometric doctrine he perceives but
dimly or not at all the simultaneously rising structure of the
doctrinal function, of which the geometric doctrine is but one
of countless values. And his false impression is, unfortunately,
confirmed by Hilbert's calling his book The Foundations ot
Geometry, a flagrant misnomer since it has, essentially, no more
to do with geometry than with a thousand other matters-a fact
exhibited with ample detail in my Mathematical Philosophy.
If an author, when building a doctrinal function, is at the
same time applying it to some kind of subject-matter and thereby
setting up a doctrine, how is the fact made manifest to a reader'?
It is done, not by definition of the subject-matter but by descrip-
tion of it, and such description may be implicit or explicit or
both. Hilbert's use of geometric figures is a kind of implicit
description of the meanings he was attaching to his variables,
or undefined terms. Euclid resorted both to that device and to
explicit description' (which he unfortunately and misleadingly
called definition) of the meanings he was giving to his undefined
terms, or variables. The subject-matter of any doctrine is in-
dicated, never by definition, but only by description of some sort.
There is no other way. All discourse, if it have content, is dis-
[Vol. 41730
DOCTRINAL FUNCTIONS
course about something which, though partially described, is
ultimately undefined.
A Word aboz the- Evolution. of Metlod for Gaining and
Formulating Knowledge
Why is it that the practice above described and exemplified is,
despite its ultimate disadvantages, so common? It is common
because, at all stages of intellectual culture, save the most
critical, the practice is a natural one. It is natural because by
nature, most men, perhaps all men, are more interested in the
concrete and particular than in the abstract and general, more
sensitive to psychological meaning than to logical relationship,
more responsive to propositional content or subject-matter than
to pure propositional form, and hence more drawn to proposi-
tions and doctrines than to propositional functions and doctrinal
functions. Compared with propositions and doctrines in respect
of nearness and warmth, propositional and doctrinal functions
are felt to be remote and glacial, and one readily understands
why it is that, as instruments for gaining and formulating
knowledge, they came vividly into consciousness and deliberate
use but recently. Indeed Euclid's Elencnts appeared only yester-
day and yet it is the first outstanding example of a well-wrought
doctrinal function and even it is disguised by wearing the ap-
pearance of being only a doctrine, a geometry. Indeed it is ques-
tionable whether Euclid himself was aware of the fact that, in
building his geometric doctrine, he was really engaged in build-
ing a doctrinal function having that doctrine as merely one of
its many proper values.
In the long course of the evolution of Method for gaining and
formulating knowledge one may say with a good deal of con-
fidence, I believe, that there have been several successive periods
of methodological development which may be distinguished or
characterized, very roughly, as follows:
I. It seems very probable that there was first of all a purely
Empirical period, a period mainly marked by the fact that
human beings then gained knowledge, or what they deemed to
be knowledge, solely by means of observation, memory, com-
parison, and the like, without formal reasoning, without strictly
logical deduction, without use of the great relation of logical
implication, which, as we have seen, holds between pure proposi-
tional forms, binding them indissolubly into systems thereof.
It is convenient to call such knowledge, or seeming knowledge,
empirical, and its articulations empirical propositions. These
were categorical, saying, with or without the use of the if-then
form, that such-and-such is the case. They naturally associated
themselves in groups according as they dealt with this or that
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or another subject. The empirical propositions thus clustering
about a given subject-hunting, say, or herds or demons or
death or family or tribe or war, etc.-constituted a kind of rudi-
mentary 'doctrine' about that subject. That in the early life
of mankind there actually was such a period of pure empiricism,
perhaps a very long period, is apt, I think, to seem highly prob-
able to any one who attentively observes the more primitive
of his own knowledge-gaining processes, those of other men and
women, and especially those of unschooled children and of primi-
tive peoples as revealed in such a work as Sumner and Keller's
Science of Society.
II. At length some one came who had the acumen to perceive
that the empirical propositions A, B, C, . . . , constituting some
empirical rudimentary 'doctrine', were not independent, but
that, if (say) A and B were true, then C was true; that, if C
were false, then A or B was false; that, in other words, as we
now say, C was logically implied by A and B and so was de-
ducible from them. That discovery was a most momentous event
in the evolution of knowledge-gaining method. It inaugurated a
new era, destined to be endless. That marvelous insight got itself
multiplied and extended; some of the rudimentary 'doctrines',
more and more of them, ceased to be purely empirical, for some
of their constituent propositions were seen to be tied together
by a new kind of bond-the unbreakable thread of logical im-
.plication. The process, slow, halting, long, continued till it cul-
minated in the insight of some one who had the genius to say:
"Since, as we know, some of the propositions of such-and-such
an empirical 'doctrine' imply some of the rest, it may be that
there are a few of them that, taken together, imply all of the
rest. And we must find out whether that is sometimes the case."
III. And the answer was found, only the other day, in the
time of Euclid in whose Elements it was shown that a small
number of propositions implied not only all the then empirically
known propositions of geometry but also many not thus known.
So began the great period of development of such hypothetical
and categorical doctrines as I have characterized in a previous
section. The concept of doctrinal function had not yet emerged
clearly into consciousness. I have already said that Euclid was
probably not aware of the fact that, when constructing his geo-
metric doctrine, he was at the same time building a doctrinal
function of which his doctrine was but one of many values, Men
then believed, as most men still believe, that the possibility of
such a doctrine was due, not to the method employed, but to
some favorable peculiarity of the subject-matter dealt with. And
they wondered whether there were other subject-matters ad-
mitting of like handling. It was generally believed that there
were not. But Spinoza had a deeper and truer instinct and he
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sought, somewhat prematurely, to apply the postulational method
to Ethics. EIis partial failure had, unfortunately, the effect of
confirming lesser men in their scepticism respecting the method's
general availability.
IV. Today we know better. The present is the age, or the
beginning of the age, of the doctrinal function. We know today
that no one can erect a hypothetical doctrine without at the same
time consciously or unconsciously erecting a doctrinal function
of the hypothetical type. We know that, though it is sometimes
difficult, it is always possible to construct a doctrinal function
that will be applicable to any prescribed kind whatever of sub-
ject-matter; and we know that any given doctrine, whether hypo-
thetical or categorical, is but one of many values of some actual
or potential doctrinal function. These facts will become more
and more evident in the course of our further discussion.
The Respective R61es of Deduction and Observation
In the work of constructing a doctrinal function what are the
means employed? It is, no doubt, sufficiently obvious that the
means are many-observation, memory, imagination, conception,
invention, expeientation, etc. But we must on no account fail
to note that among all the means employed there is one that is
supreme: I refer to Deduction, all the other means being but
auxiliary, subsidiary, subordinate thereto.
There is, however, another question to be asked regarding
means. Supposing a doctrinal function-to have been constructed,
what are the means for applying it to subject-matter-for as-
certaining, that is, its proper values-for determining the true
doctrines derivable from it by substituting verifiers of its pos-
tulates for the variables in these? Such verifiers are not given
-they have to be found. In the work of discovering them what
are the means employed? It is again evident, as in the previous
case, that the means are many. And we have again to note that
among all the means there is one that is supreme: this time I
refer to Observation, all the others being but auxiliary, sub-
sidiary, subordinate thereto.
We may briefly summarize by saying that the laws are: (1)
no Deduction, no Doctrinal Function; (2) no Observation, no
true Doctrine.
M1'athenwztics a~zd Scioaicc
The reader has doubtless surmised that in the foregoing I have
been really speaking of Mathematics and of Science without
using their names. The surmise is just. The discussion has at
length conducted us to a position where we may, I think, dis-
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cern very clearly the essential nature of mathematics, the essen-
tial nature of science, the radical distinction between the two
great coordinate enterprises, their respective scopes, and the
ways in which they are interrelated and enabled to cooperate.
In the light of what has been thus far said in this paper, the
following succinct statements touching mathematics and science
will, I believe, be found to be not only readily intelligible but
just and helpful.
The familiar phrase, an established proposition, will occur
and recur. By it I shall not mean a proposition absolutely known
to be true. "Absolute certainty," as I have elsewhere said, "is
a privilege of uneducated minds-and fanatics. It is, for scien-
tific folk, an unattainable ideal." By an 'established' proposi-
tion, I shall mean one supported by the general consensus of
opinion among experts in the field or subject to which the propo-
sition belongs. I need hardly say that a proposition may be an
established one for a period of time and then cease to be such,
for the history of thought affords many examples of the fact.
The reader is requested to observe carefully the parallel be-
tween the statements now to be made about mathematics and
those to be subsequently made about science.
(1) Regarded as an enterprise Mathematics-sheer mathe-
matics, I mean, and not its applications-has for its character-
istic aim the establishment of doctrinal functions of the hypo-
thetical type.
(2) A mathematical proposition is an established hypothetical
proposition, and is always a constituent of some actual or poten-
tial doctrinal function of the hypothetical type.
(3) Regarded as a body of achievements mathematics, at any
given date, comprises all and only such mathematical proposi-
tions as are then extant, and so it embraces all such established
doctrinal functions ot hypothetical type, or parts thereof, as
then exist.
(4) Mathematical method consists of all the means available
for use in establishing hypothetical propositions. Among all
such means Deduction is sovereign-sovereign in the sense that
without deduction no mathematics whatever would be possible.
(5) Every question that mathematics endeavors to answer is
essentially of the form: If such-and-such statements be true,
then what additional statements are, by logical necessity, also
true? So we see that, in the sense indicated, the field of mathe-
matics is the field of questions about the world of logical Possi-
bility.
And now respecting Science I ought, ideally, to say, as the
reader can hardly fail to perceive, and, were the time ripe for
it, I would say: Regarded as an enterprise Science-sheer science
and not its applications-has for its characteristic aim the es-
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tablishment of doctrinal functions of the categorical type. But
the time is not yet ripe, for, though many such functions exist,
since (as I have before pointed out) one of them has been built
whenever one of the hypothetical type has been built, yet men
of science have paid them little or no heed, being in fact hardly
aware of their existence or even their possibility. What men of
science have been interested in is, not categorical doctrinal func-
tions, but categorical doctrines, and they have not yet advanced
to the critical point of perceiving that any such doctrine is merely
a proper value of some doctrinal function, much less that it is
but one among many such proper values. On that account I
have decided to compromise here, to step down from the top
of the ladder to the first rung below it and define as follows:
(1') Regarded as an enterprise Science has for its character-
istic aim the establishment of categorical doctrines.
(2') A scientific proposition is an established categorical prop-
osition, and is always a constituent of an actual or potential
categorical doctrine.
(3') Regarded as a body of achievements science, at any given
date, comprises all and only such scientific propositions as are
then extant, and so it embraces all such categorical doctrines, or
parts thereof, as then exist.
(4') Scientific method consists of all the means available for
use in establishing categorical propositions. Among such means
Observation is sovereign-sovereign in the sense that without
observation science would be impossible.
(5') Every question that science endeavors to answer is essen-
tially of the form: What are the facts regarding the properties
or relations of such-and-such a part or aspect of what is, not
merely possible, but actual? So it is seen that the field of science
is the field of all questions about the Actual world, whether liv-
ing or non-living, organic or inorganic, material or immaterial,
physical or psychical.
About Applications of Matkenatics
Mathematics, as we have seen, consists of hypothetical doctrinal
functions and parts thereof. It follows that any application of
such a function to subject-matter is an application of mathe-
matics to that subject-matter. Such applications ought never
to be confused, as they commonly and harmfully are, with mathe-
matics itself. In order that I may be quite clear in this matter,
I beg the reader will indulge me in a little repetition. As before,
let P be a system of postulates, P,, P_, . . . , P1,; let T,, T,... be
their implicates or theorems; suppose the postulates to be veri-
fled, thereby the T's are also verified; let P' be the resulting
set of true propositions, P',, P'2 ,... , P'I, corresponding to the
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P's; and let T', T'., ... be the resulting true propositions cor-
responding to the T's.
Now consider the following four bodies:
(1) The body of propositions, P implies T1, P implies T,...
(2) The body of propositional functions, P, P, • , P:, T1,
T,... ,
(3) The body of propositions, P' implies T', P' implies T',,
(4) The body of propositions, P', P'2, . . , P', T11, T'12 , ...
Compare (1) and (3) ; (1) is a hypothetical doctrinal func-
tion-an integral part of sheer mathematics; (3) is a hypotheti-
cal doctrine resulting from applying (1) -from applying mathe-
matics-to subject-matter through verification; it is not sheer
mathematics but an application thereof; (3) has the same form
as (1) but, unlike (1), it is a doctrine because its impliers and
implicates have content or subject-matter and it is a true doc-
trine because the content is a verifying content; (3) is one of
many proper values of (1) ; (1) is established by Deduction but
(3) is got from (1) by Observation, for without observation
verification is impossible.
Next compare (2) and (4) ; (2) is a categorical propositional
function, and, except for the complomise above made, it should
be called an integral part of sheer science, and then (4), a
categorical doctrine, would be consistently called an application
of (2) to subject-matter through verification; but, in virtue
of that practically necessary but logically infernal compromise,
we say that (4) is an integral part of sheer science, and by
'applications' of science we shall have to mean its uses in
medicine, for example, or engineering, or the like; to establish
any proposition of (4) demands observation unless it be known,
as it may not be, that the P"s imply the T"s, in which case it
suffices to extend verifying observation to the P"s only.
The Scope of Science aind the Scope of Mathematics
In the nomencliture of scientific methodology there is probably
no more important term than Definition, and there is certainly
no term more commonly, harmfully and shamelessly abused. The
distinction between definition and description is almost uni-
versally unrecognized or ignored. Yet the difference between
them is grave, fundamental, radical. Any true statement about
a thing is a partial description of it, but to define the thing it
is necessary to indicate some mark belonging to it and to nothing
else. The endeavors of scientific men to tell what science is
have produced a pretty extensive literature. It abounds in partial
descriptions of what the various writers have variously meant
by science, and these descriptions, often insightful and light-
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giving, are endlessly diversified and are frequently incompatible;
but in that literature one will search in vain for any thing that
may be rightly called a definition of Science, much less a defini-
tion of it that has approved itself as authoritative or standard.
Unless and until we know what we mean by science there can
be little or no use talking of the scope of science. That is one
of the reasons why in a preceding section I was at so much
pains to construct a genuine definition of the term.
It is evident that according to that definition the scope of
science-not as a dated body of achievements but as an enter-
prise-excludes no element or aspect of the Actual world. In
other words, no matter whether a given thing be material or
immaterial, physical or psychical, objective or subjective, human
or non-human, societal or non-societal, if it be such that it is
significant-meaningful, not meaningless-to ask whether it has
such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such relation,
then that thing is a fit subject for scientific investigation and
falls within the scope of science. The conception is broad. It
obviously embraces not only the subject-matters of the so-called
physical sciences but also those of law, economics, history, ethics,
anthropology, philosophy, political theory, and sociology. It is fre-
quently said-said, moreover, by men who ought to know better
and who would know better if they reflected upon the matter
maturely-that the scope of science, rightly understood, excludes
the so-called moral or social sciences. The assertion is made
chiefly on the alleged ground that workers in the so-called social
sciences, because unable to employ Experimentation as in the
laboratories of certain physical sciences, cannot arrive at trust-
worthy conclusions. In response to that criticism I venture to
repeat here a part of what I have said elsewhere.
"In the technical laboratory-sense of the term, experimentation is, when
practicable, often of great value; in the ease of many problems, it is indeed
indispensable; but it not so in all. The laboratory meaning of the term is
much too narrow.
"For an ideal experiment, were such a thing possible, would be one per-
formed under completely known conditions; but the thing is not possible-
genuine ideals can be endlessly approximated but can never be reached.
Knowledge of conditions is a variable, and it has two limits: an upper limit-
conditions completely known-and a lower limit-conditions completely un-
known. Neither of the limits is ever attained-all experimentation whatso-
ever occurs between them-below the upper limit and above the lower limit.
It is inexpedient, quite unfair and purely wilful to draw a narrow circle
about the upper limit and say that experiments inside the circle are cientific
and that those outside are not. The range between the limits is vast, and
we may even say significantly that the whole life of mankind through the
ages has been a long manifold experiment in the art of living in the world.
See (1') especially, but also (2'), (3') and (4'), at page 735, supra.
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"Moreover we must not lose sight of the fact that, among the means consti-
tuting scientific method, experimentation is, even at its best, only a highly
useful servant of the king, and the king is Observation." 0
And now we must ask: What is the scope of mathematics
-of sheer mathematics as distinguished from its applications?
From what has been said it is clear that to ask that question
is the same as asking: What is the scope of postulational think-
ing? Or, again, What is the scope of doctrinal functions of the
hypothetical type? And the answer is: The scope of mathematics
-not as a dated body of achievements but as an enterprise-
coincides with the field of the relation called Logical Implication.
That unique relation is perhaps the austerest and most powerful
among all the relations known to the human intellect, and its
field is vast, immeasurably vast. We know that the number
and variety of propositional functions-pure propositional forms
-is endless. We know that these forms are not all of them
independent but that, on the contrary, a properly selected small
set of them serve to imply, not indeed all the rest, far from
it, but an infinitude of them; that another small set imply an-
other infinitude; and so on. Therein resides the possibility of
erecting those majestic mathematical edifices whch I have named
doctrinal functions of the hypothetical type. A good many of
these have been already constructed, and others are in process
of construction. What of the future? Is there a finite limit to
the possible number of such edifices? There is every indication
that no such limit exists. But, if there be such a limit, it might,
conceivably, be actually reached after the lapse of a finite time.
In that event, deduction as a living process would be extinct;
mathematics would no longer expand; as an enterprise having
attained its aim, it would cease to be; nevertheless, as a body of
achievements, mathematics would continue to exist for study, for
admiration, for instrumental use in science, and for endlessly
progressive application to all the diverse subject-matters found
in the actual world.
In virtue of the foregoing considerations it is clear, I hope,
and quite noteworthy, that, taken together, the enterprise of
Science and the enterprise of Mathematics embrace the whole
knowledge-seeking activity of mankind, where by "knowledge"
is meant the kind of knowledge that admits of being made
articulate in the form of propositions. The restriction is de-
signed to guard against what would else be the possibility of
my being thought to forget or to ignore the noetic power of
sheer artistic sensibility.
See my HUMANIS AND SCIENCE (1931) 74-75,
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The R61e of Doctrinal Functions in Rational Thought
At the beginning of this article I stated that it aims to answer
two questions. The first of these has now been answered pretty
fully. The second, though it too has been answered in part, de-
mands further consideration. It requires to be answered both
more fully and more explicitly. In dealing with it I shall be
mainly, though not quite exclusively, concerned with doctrinal
functions of the hypothetical type. Inasmuch as such functions
are the characteristic product of thorough-going postulational
thinking, our question is virtually equivalent to this: What is
the r6le of postulational thinking in man's endeavors to under-
stand the possible and the actual worlds? And again, because
sheer mathematics aims at the establishment of hypothetical
doctrinal functions, we may, if we like, conceive our question
to be this: What is the r8le of sheer mathematics in the life
of reason? Lest some reader shy at the appearance here of the
term mathematics, I hasten to add that the r~le in question will
be found to be immensely greater than that of 'mathematics'
as this term has been traditionally, and still is commonly and
uncritically, understood.
Let us recognize that our entire discussion has been concerned
with certain ideuls. The concept of a doctrinal function, whether
of the hypothetical or of the categorical type, is the concept
of an ideal; the concept of a hypothetical or of a categorical
doctrine as a proper value of a corresponding function is the
concept of another ideal. These kindred ideals obviously belong
at once both to the methodology of research and to the art of
formulating and communicating knowledge. Like every other
genuine ideal, they are not goals-posts to be reached-but are
perfections to be endlessly pursued, to be more and more nearly
approximated, though never quite attained.
The process of approximating them is a secular process. It
began, no doubt, in the remotest human past-in the very be-
ginning of that prehistoric period which I have called the period
of pure empiricism-and it has continued to operate, with greater
and greater strength, on down through the intervening ages of
man's increasing endeavors to understand, by means of Observa-
tion and Logic, the two-fold world of the Actual and the Possi-
ble. Yet even today realization of the two great ideals has
reached a close approximation in only a few instances, where
circumstance or subject-matter has been especially favorable,
as in geometly, for example. Nevertheless the movement has
been universal; it has been going on, I mean, in all fields of in-
tellectual activity, though in some of them the process has been
for the most part quite unconscious, as if men were literally
driven upward along the steep endless way towards perfection
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by a half-blind, infinitely patient, untiring cosmic urge. When
to that stress is added the lure of the ideals themselves, once
these are understood, and their advintages and beauty are seen,
the pace of approximation is greatly accelerated.
One should, therefore, expect to find that the r6le of doctrinal
functions in rational thought is everywhere discernibly present
in the literature of such thought, conspicuously and dominantly
present in rare instances, but for the most part only in embryonic
form, in rudimentary fashion, as if, against great difficulties,
it were slowly struggling into existence from some deep im-
pulsion native in the very constitution of intellect itself. And
the expectation is realized.
The few almost dazzlingly bright examples of well-nigh com-
plete realization of the ideals are familiar and need not detain
us. It will profit us more to look for the r8le in question in fields
where, because the subject-matters are far less tractable, pre-
cision and cogency of thinking are far more difficult to attain.
And first a fairly obvious remark about rational discourse in
general. In a previous section I signalized the very significant
fact that in any average specimen of reasoned, or ostensibly
reasoned, discourse, most of the statements purporting to be
propositions are not propositions, but, in virtue of their unde-
fined terms, or variables, are propositional functions. Commonly
there is present at least some show, frequently very inadequate,
of proving some of them, of deducing them, that is, from others,
and so there is a semblance of some of the statements being
postulates and of others being theorems, though quite without
any clear or formal indication of such a division. The author of
the discourse regards it as the setting forth of a true doctrine.
Of course he is mistaken. It can be no doctrine at all, whether
true or false, unless and until definite meanings have been
assigned to its variables. What, then, is it? Evidently it pre-
sents the physiognomy of a doctrinal function, albeit an ill-con-
ceived, very immature, badly fabricated one. Because it is taken
for a doctrine and because, as often happens, its variables are
represented by prejudice-arousing, emotion-stirring terms, it
engenders endless controversy. Is such a discourse, then, worse
than worthless? No doubt such is frequently the case. But, when
it is, it is not due to the functional features of it. It is due to
the fact that, regarded as a function, it is so very incomplete,
so badly bungled, so slovenly built. The lesson of it is a lesson
regarding the nature of our minds: our intellects are such that
they cannot seriously undertake the production of rational dis-
course without availing themselves, in at least some measure,
of the frame and manner of postulational thinking, and in the
product there is always detectible, in at least rude outline, the
pattern of a doctrinal function. Let us glance at some instances.
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Consider, for example, our American Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Here the presence of the pattern is so evident as
scarcely to need pointing out. It is indeed slightly disguised by
the fact that, in accord with the regnant plilosophy of that
time, the Declaration's postulates were held to be "self-evident
truths," just as in that day the axioms of geometry were re-
garded as self-evident. The disguise, however, is thin, for today
we see very clearly that the office of those so-called "self-evident
truths" was nothing but the office of a certain set of political
postulates. In these the undefined terms, or variables, are so
conspicuous as to require no specification. Having laid down
their postulates, the authors, by means of a grave argument in-
volving citation of many great abuses, proceeded to deduce and-
to enunciate, among many fairly deducible but there undeduced
implicates, one momentous theorem, to the effect that it was
not only the right but the duty of the Colonies to separate from
the mother country and to establish an independent govern-
ment of their own.
For another example belonging to the field of the social
sciences, take the Constitution of the United States. The articles
of the Constitution are the postulates; the theorems are the
unexpressed assertions that the various great ends specified in
the preamble will be attained; the arguments designed to prove
the assertions of implication of the attainability of these ends
are found in the debates attending the construction and ratifica-
tion of the instrument. In a nut shell, it is as if the framers
had said: If these various articles be adopted, then, as our rea-
sonings prove, such-and-such stated purposes will be realized.
Obviously we have here a striking example of general conforma-
tion to the pattern of postulational thinking, and in the result
of it, since major terms are undefined and so are variables, we
have, in skeletal form, a doctrinal function of hypothetical type.
Similar examples abound. A familiar one is the classic Political
Economy of Ricardo, basing itself upon a set of broad assump-
tions and deducing therefrom as from a system of postulates
-with much less, however, than mathematical rigor-a body of
conclusions or theorems, that had the fortune to be treated as
'established' propositions for some generations.
A very recent and much better example, in the field of the
preceding one, is found in Jacques Rueff's brilliant book, Dcs
Sciences Physiques aux Scienwes Morales,- where, in a weighty
chapter concerned with political economy, the author carefully
7 Mr. Rueff's book has been excellently translated into English by Mr.
Herman Green and, along with an admirable Introduction by Professors
Herman Oliphant and Abram Hewitt, has been published by The Johns
Hopkins Press under the title, FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THE SOCIAL SCIE.XCES
(1929).
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lays down a small number of postulates (called axioms by him)
and then deduces from them, with scrupulous regard for logical
rigor, a series of important conclusions. It is notable that M.
Rueff quite rightly calls these conclusions "theorems," for the
term theorem, when properly used, signifies, not a mathematical
proposition, p implies q, but only the implicate q.
Turning for a moment to biology one readily sees that in the
Darwinian theory of evolution, such familiar principles as 'spon-
taneous generation', 'struggle for existence', 'survival of the
fittest', and a few other assumptions, were designed to render,
the service of postulates, being thought to imply the occurrence
of the main facts observed in the development of organic life.
I have already alluded to the somewhat premature, not very
successful, yet truly magnificant attempt of Spinoza to erect a
theory of Ethics patterned after the postulational method of
Euclidean geometry. In this connection it is highly edifying to
see both that and how M. Rueff, in his above-cited work, has
demonstrated that, among known types of ethics, there is none
to which postulational thinking is inapplicable.
Professor R. D. Carmichael's Theory of Relativity is a notable
contribution to the movement by which even the most recent
developments in physics are being gradually shaped to the form
of a doctrinal function. Here I must pause a moment to com-
mend strongly to students of legal science Professor Carmichael's
recently published Logic of Discovery in which the role of the
doctrinal function in research and in the formulation of results
is discussed very understandingly and helpfully.
Perhaps I ought to refer here to my previous article On the
Study of Legal Science.," in which I have signalized both the
desirability and especially the feasibility of applying the method
of postulational thinking not only to each of the branches of
law but also to the law itself viewed as a whole.
To extend the list of citations would not be difficult but it
seems needless. It is, I think, now sufficiently evident that, as
before said, our intellects, in whatever field they specialize,
do in fact, no matter why, tend to avail themselves, at first un-
consciously, then consciously, then more and more consciously
and deliberately, of the processes that lead inevitably and ulti-
mately to the construction and establishment of doctrinal func-
tions.
Some of the Reasons Why
I have emphasized the long, slow, often unconscious, seemingly
inevitable, secular development of postulational thinking in
course of the evolution of knowledge-seeking methods and of the
8 (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 413;
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arts of formulating and communicating knowledge. Before clos-
ing I must try to indicate explicitly some of its vindicating
virtues, some of the peculiar benefits or advantages that accrue
from its use, sustain it, and continually accelerate the speed
of its conquering march.
One of them, and not the least one, is esthetic. The human
intellect is, in its deepest nature, in its heart of heart, an artist.
A well-wrought doctrinal function of major kind-a majestic
and indestructible Form of forms, "poised in eternal calm" above
the changeful things of the sensuous world-affords in the con-
templation of it the peculiar delight of a great work of art.
Such a function or any like-formed proper value of it is indeed
a work of art of the highest order. Not of sensuous art, for it
is not heard, like poetry or music, nor seen, like painting or
sculpture or architecture. Its inner harmony and the qualities
of its structure and form are not shown in solar light-they are
revealed only in psychic light, to the infinitely delicate sensi-
bility of the pure understanding. The builder of a doctrinal
function owns the authority of the austerest of the muses-the
Muse of Logical Rigor-and the product of his craftsmanship is
a work of art, but the art is supersensuous.
Another of the benefits of postulational thinking is the instru-
mental service rendered by it to science. We have seen that
postulational thinking establishes none but hypothetical proposi-
tions (in answer to questions about the world of possibility) ;
that science establishes none but categorical propositions (in
response to questions about the actual world) ; that the former
is done by Deduction, and the latter by Observation. Though
neither deduction nor observation can take the other's place,
they can cooperate: each can help the other in the other's task.
And this reciprocal service is of three closely kindred but dis-
tinct kinds. Let us glance at them.
Without the help of postulational thinking science would be
purely empirical; the group of propositions constituting a branch
thereof would have none but a kind of psychological unity due
to their clustering about some particular subject; for mere ob-
servation can tie no logical knots. If, then, today a branch of
science has some logical unity, if some of its propositions are
known to be implicates of others, science is wholly indebted for
that kind of increasing organization to the help given by her
sister enterprise, postulational thinking.
Again, let us suppose that by the mentioned kind of help all
of the established propositions of some scientific branch have
been found to be deducible from a set of postulates. Note what
happens. It is that the postulates are found to imply zczo propo-
sitions. These have to be tested-tested by observation. Thus
we see that deduction, postulational thinking, serves to show
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observation where to look and what to look for. Note, too, in
passing, how handsomely observation requites her benefactor.
In most cases it happens sooner or later that at least one of the
"new" propositions is found by observation to be invalid, or
false. Thereupon postulational thinking is instantly confronted
with a new task-that of so altering the postulates that the
false proposition shall not be among their implicates.
Once more. A man of science makes a guess at the cause or
the law or the necessary and sufficient conditions for a group of
seemingly related phenomena. The guess, commonly dignified
with the name 'scientific hypothesis', requires to be tested by
obsevation applied to the logical consequences of the hypothesis.
Prior to such a validity test the consequences have to be ascer-
tained. This has to be done in the only available way, namely,
by deduction, which treats the 'scientific hypothesis', not as a
content-bearing proposition, but as a postulate, as a mere implier,
as a sheer propositional form.,
In closing, I wish barely to mention two further considerations
touching the merits of postulational thinking. One of them
relates to the art of logical criticism; the other to what might,
with some propriety, be called the psycho-analysis of discourse.
"La critique," said Cousin, "est la vie de la science." It will
hardly be disputed, I think, that a discourse never gets examined
quite so thoroughly as when its author or reader critically com-
pares its structure with the universal pattern of doctrinal func-
tions, namely: primitive (undefined) terms, or variables; de-
rived (defined) terms, or constants; primitive (unproved)
propositional forms, or postulates'; derived (proved) proposi-
tional forms, implicates, or theorems.
The final consideration is this: In proportion as one is well
bred in the ways of postulational thinking one becomes vividly
aware of the fact that within or under every species of dis-
course, except such as has been thoroughgoingly postulational-
ized, there lurk obscure or even completely hidden assumptions
or postulates; that these, being employed quite unconsciously,
are often more effective than conscious reasoning itself in deter-
mining attitudes, theses, and conclusions; that, on every account,
such hidden determinants of life, conduct, and thought ought
to be dragged forth from their hiding places into the light;
and that, therefore, the disciplining of men, women, and children
in the art of "postulate detection," as I have called it in my book-
let on Thinking about Thinking, is an unsurpassed obligation of
education in all of its subjects and at every stage.
9 For a detailed exhibition of the respective parts played by mathematles
and by science in that constantly recurring situation, I venture to refor tho
reader to my Pastures of Wonder (1929) 158-166.
[Vol. 41744
